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Abstract We develop a general theoretical model to compare two different policymakers1
both facing tax evasion. Policymakers differs in that they aim to maximize either the ﬁscal2
revenues (T ) as in a social-democracy as, e.g., Sweden, or the GDP as in a capitalistic3
country as, e.g., the USA. Both Bureaus can manoeuvre the tax rate and the share of tax4
receipts spent to ﬁght the tax evasion rather than to increase the public capital. Our model5
merges the indications of two distinct, and sometimes conﬂicting, approaches to the analysis6
of tax evasion in that reconciling them.We also ﬁnd that the feedbacks between the private and7
public sector are linked to some Laffer-type relationships usually unexplored by the existing8
literature. As compared to capitalistic systems, then, our results show that social-democracies9
end up imposing higher tax rates and, possibly, more pervasive regulations. Consequently,10
they are likely to suffer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP ratios. This notwithstanding, social-11
democracies spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the other hand, T -maximizing12
governments have better institutional settings and greater employment rates. Whichever the13
preferred target, however, no policymaker is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may14
explain why this latter is so pervasive and persistent even among the richest countries.15
Keywords Quantitative model · Bureaucracy · Tax evasion · Regulations · Taxation16
1 Introduction17
A well-known anecdote states that tax evasion is as old as taxation. By the same token one18
may also add that since taxation is as old as State, the same can be said for the tax evasion.
M. Bovi
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Piazza dell’Indipendenza, 4, 00185 Rome, Italy
e-mail: mbovi@istat.it
R. Cerqueti (B)
Department of Economics and Law, University of Macerata, Via Crescimbeni 20, 62100 Macerata, Italy
e-mail: roy.cerqueti@unimc.it
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In the words of Klepper and Nagin (1989, p. 1) “Three things are certain in life: death, taxes,19
and mankind’s unrelenting effort to evade both.” The spiral “higher tax rates, higher tax20
evasion” is cited as one of the main reasons why the Roman Empire fell (Bernardi 1970).21
More recently, according to the cross section evidence collected by Porta and Shleifer (2008),22
the share of tax evasion on ofﬁcial GDP varies, to mention the most conservative ﬁgures,23
from almost 30% in poorest countries to up 8% in richest economies. Otherwise stated, the24
tax evasion is an immanent fact of life around the world.25
The shadow economy1 has some positive effects. For instance, it provides an alternative26
social safety net and may be the necessary ﬁrst-step for training the new ﬁrms. This said, in27
both political and economic circles it is usually seen more as a problem than as a resource,28
and “zero-tolerance” announces are commonly heard. The presence of hidden activities, in29
fact, may affect the design of national tax systems and trigger links between legal and illegal30
activities. It may then impose constraints on public revenues generation and, therefore, limit31
the provision of necessary public goods/services. Moreover, e.g. due to unfair competition,32
shadow activities are likely to hamper the GDP. Finally, it has been observed a strong positive33
correlation between tax morale and institutional quality (Frey and Torgler 2007; Hug and34
Spörri 2011).35
The pervasiveness and persistence of the tax evasion side-by-side with better and better36
anti-evasion technology and worldwide zero-tolerance announces suggests to examine (i)37
why the phenomenon is so hard to eradicate practically in all economic environments and,38
accordingly, (ii) its effects in different economic systems.39
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on these issues by developing a general equi-40
librium model aimed at examining the theoretical links between tax evasion, macro policies41
and institutions. Speciﬁcally, we study the persistence and the effects of the tax evasion when42
policymakers pursue two alternative macroeconomic targets, namely maximizing ﬁscal rev-43
enues (T) or the GDP. The logic of this clear-cut in policymakers’ goal is to more easily44
compare these two distinct situations which, by and large, can be thought of as representa-45
tive of, respectively, social-democracy and capitalism. Thus, our analysis can also be useful46
for the understanding of what a developing or transition country may expect to face should47
it follow a social-democratic rather than a capitalistic road to develop. On the other hand,48
anticipating one of our results, we ﬁnd that governments cannot be revenues—and GDP-49
maximizers at the same time so that a political dilemma emerge. Though this is a somewhat50
expected outcome, as far as we know ours is the ﬁrst model to formalize it. Even more so51
because ours is a general equilibrium framework. In building our model we have borrowed52
from both the portfolio choice tradition (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974 and53
followers) and the recent institutional approach (Johnson et al. 1998, 1999). As we will say,54
these strands of research have different views about the sign of the correlation linking tax55
rate and tax evasion. Therefore, our model allows to reconcile this dissonance. We have also56
opted to keep the model rather general. The idea is that the abstractness of our setting avoids57
limiting the study to a peculiar analytical setting. In fact, we can afford to not rely on explicit58
functions for the parameters which, as e.g. in the case of variables describing the institutional59
setting, may turn out to be tricky. The generality of the setting means that our model nests60
several speciﬁcations and, accordingly, it is very robust.61
Other contributions of our paper that we want to stress are the following. Comparing two62
different economic systems—such as, say, Sweden and the USA—with a special focus on tax63
evasion allows us to uncover and discuss some new Laffer-type non linearities. These latter64
1 While the shadow (unofﬁcial, irregular…) economy takes many forms—e.g., illegal activities, unreported
income (tax evasion) and the informal sector—the focus of this paper is the tax evasion.
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A quantitative view
come from the feedbacks between the private and public sector and are typically neglected65
in the existing literature (Section 2). Then, we offer a theoretical framework that could66
help to better understand the empirical ﬁndings reported by several papers often based on67
just sketched theoretical considerations (see, e.g., Friedman et al. (2000) and Johnson et al.68
(1999) just tomention twopapers dealingwith the set of variables here under scrutiny). In fact,69
given the easy-to-imagine data problems affecting variables such as tax evasion, institutional70
efﬁciency, etc. (low quality, reduced time series and cross section comparability, etc.,), our71
conceptual robust setting can act like a map that gives coherence to empirical inquiry.72
Side by side with the mentioned policy dilemma, other results stem from our analy-73
sis. As compared to GDP-maximizing states, social-democracies tend to impose higher tax74
rates,more pervasive regulations and, consequently, to suffer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP75
ratios. All this in spite of the fact that social-democracies spend relativelymore to contrast tax76
dodgers than capitalistic countries. On the other hand, revenuesmaximizing governments can77
afford to have better institutional settings and greater participation rates. In no case, however,78
the Bureau is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may explain why this latter is so79
pervasive and persistent all around the world.80
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews some literature81
related to our topic. Section 3 contains the constitutive elements of the theoretical model.82
Sections 4 and 5 deal with the optimization problems of the private sector and the State,83
respectively. In Sect. 6 the theoretical ﬁndings are discussedwith a focus on two representative84
cases. Some supporting evidence is also presented. The last section collects concluding85
remarks. The proofs of the main results are reported in the Appendix.86
2 A brief literature review87
Despite its sheer magnitude and ever-lasting presence, the macroeconomic consequences of88
tax evasion on revenues and, especially, on output loss, has received relatively little attention.89
As for public revenues loss, in a simple Keynesian model, Peacock and Shaw (1982) were90
the ﬁrst to show that, provided the marginal net propensity to spend is less than unity, tax91
evasion decreases the tax revenue. In a more general framework, Ricketts (1984) conﬁrms92
the negative effect of tax evasion upon the tax revenue. Years later, Lai and Chang (1988);93
Zameck (1989), and Lai et al. (1995) showed that tax evasion may even lead to an increase in94
the tax revenue. A common problem with these papers is the lack of microfoundations. More95
recently, Turnovsky andBasher (2009) have developed amicrofounded two-sectormodel and96
have examined the role of the informal sector in limiting the government’s ability to increase97
tax revenues. As for more direct links between growth and tax evasion, Caballé and Panadés98
(2000) have analyzed how the tax compliance policy affects the rate of economic growth.99
They consider a microfounded overlapping generations model in which the paths of all the100
involved macroeconomic variables are endogenously determined and perform comparative101
statics analyses of changes in both the probability of inspection and the penalty fee imposed on102
tax evaders. They show the nonoptimality from the growth viewpoint of an inspection policy103
inducing truthful revelation of income for exogenously given levels of both the penalty and the104
tax rates. Alike, Chen’s (2003) microfounded model of endogenous growth has inquired into105
the effects of three government policies on tax rate, tax evasion, and economic growth. These106
three policies are as follows: increasing the unit cost of tax evasion, raising punishment107
and ﬁnes, and increasing the probability of detection. He ﬁnds that the three policies are108
quantitatively effective in discouraging tax evasion, but have small growth effects. These109
latter increase when the public capital has very strong positive externalities. Ihrig and Moe110
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(2004) have analized a simple dynamic model of an agent who chooses to allocate time111
between the formal and informal sector while accounting for taxation policies. They argue112
that their model explain why, as an economy grows from a low level of real GDP per capita,113
changes in informal employment are large. From the normative standpoint these authors114
suggest that while reductions in the tax rate, combined with increased enforcement, reduce115
the size of the informal sector, tax rate reductions and penalties for evasion are the most116
effective. Another strand of research (Johnson et al. 1998, 1999; Friedman et al. 2000) has117
been pointing out the role of institutions in explaining the presence/inﬂuence of the tax118
evasion in/on economic systems. Basically, it argues that the efﬁciency of the public sector is119
connectedwith the tax evasion because the low quality of bureaucracy reduces the probability120
to detect tax dodgers and this increases, other things being equal, the optimal share of hidden121
income chosen by agents. In turn, this stops achieving sufﬁcient revenues to fund good122
institutions. Furthermore, bad governments offer low quality and insufﬁcient public services,123
making people less willing to pay for them and more willing to search for alternative, hidden,124
service networks.2 These studies underline that another stable equilibrium, opposite to the125
bad one, is possible. This is why this “institutional” literature is sometimes referred to as126
the two-equilibria framework. Rich countries cluster in this second polar situation, which127
can be labeled “good equilibrium” because small hidden sectors, large ﬁscal revenues, high128
tax rates and honest/appreciated institutions consistently coexist. Thus, in sharp contrast129
with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) traditional result, tax rate and tax evasion may be130
negatively related. Yet, recently Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010), focusing exclusively on good131
equilibria, have found empirical evidence that tax rate and tax evasion are signiﬁcantly132
positively related.3133
Other papers establishingmultiple equilibria are those ofMyles andNaylor (1996), Rosser134
et al. (2003) and Cule and Fulton (2009). Myles and Naylor (1996) develop a social custom135
and conformity model of tax evasion and obtain two equilibria: one with no evasion and one136
with total evasion. According to Rosser et al. (2003), then, the returns to labor of participating137
in shadow activities are increasing for awhile as the relative size of the hidden sector increases138
and then decrease beyond some point. This can create a critical threshold that can generate139
two distinct stable equilibrium states, one with a small underground sector and one with140
a large underground sector. Finally, in Cule and Fulton (2009) the source of the multiple141
equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. Speciﬁcally,142
in bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have143
perverse impacts and increase cheating. Somewhat mirroring the institutional literature these144
papers deal especially with bad equilibria, whereas the tax evasion is likely to be persistent.145
3 The theoretical framework146
In building our model we have borrowed from both the portfolio choice tradition (Alling-147
ham and Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974 and followers) and the recent institutional approach.148
Our aim is to study the tax-evasion-related links between these two agents when the Bureau149
is either GDP—or revenues-maximizing. In our model there are two players, a represen-150
tative private agent and the government. The former solves standard consumption-leisure151
2 This spiral is in line both with the results of Hanousek and Palda (2004), and with the observed strong
positive correlation between tax morale and institutional quality (Frey and Torgler 2007).
3 In fact, in a sub sample analysis targeted to richer countries, even Friedman et al. (2000) did not ﬁnd
evidence against the traditional positive correlation between tax rate and tax evasion. Results by Pommerehne
and Weck-Hannemann (1996) support the positive correlation.
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optimization problems, with the exception that she may hide some income. It is worth notic-152
ing that, should the representative agent hide or declare all of her income, the economic153
system would be, respectively, totally under—or totally overground. As we will see, our154
model enables the informal sector to remain part of the economy in equilibrium. Since,155
mature or not, data inform that all economic systems have shadow sectors, the mixed equilib-156
rium is consistent with empirical observations. The optimal share of tax evasion chosen by157
individuals is constrained by the expected penalty and tax evasion-related costs [e.g., shel-158
tering efforts. See Cross and Shaw (1982)]. As in Barro (1990), the private sector beneﬁts159
from public capital.160
In order to maximize either ﬁscal receipts or the GDP, the State decides the tax rate161
and the share of public outlay devoted to ﬁght the tax evasion rather than to increase the162
public capital.4 These two goals should be seen as representative of the policies usually163
implemented, respectively, in mature social-democratic (say, Sweden) and capitalistic (say,164
the USA) countries. Several Laffer-type relationships emerge in our context.165
Beyond the usual mnemonic L (labor input), Y (output), G and T (respectively, public166
outlays and revenues), throughout the paper we will use the following notations:167
• r ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to detect a tax dodger5;168
• t ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate;169
• y ∈ [0, 1] is the share of undeclared income on total income;170
• e is an index that measures the level of regulations. For homogeneity, e is assumed to171
vary between [0, 1] with e = 0 indicating the case of no regulation (disorder), and e = 1172
the case of totally regulated economy (dictatorship);173
• α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the public expenditure G spent to increase r . It represents the174
fraction of public money directly devoted to ﬁght the tax evasion.6 This kind of outlay175
should be meant as comprehensive of both “sticks”, e.g. providing for tax inspectors, and176
“carrots”, e.g. reducing the complexity of the tax system. Instead, 1 − α is the fraction177
of G devoted to increase/improve the public capital, the only other outlay available for178
policymakers. As in Barro (1990), we assume that public capital has positive external179
effects on GDP.180
For simplicity, in our model T = G and we deﬁne r as an increasing continuous function of181
α that we will write as r = r(α). Therefore, r is invertible, i.e. there exists a function p such182
that:183
r(α) = r˜ ⇔ α = p(r˜). (1)184
It is important to note since now that good institutions (i.e. those with both large r and,185
as we will see, α) can afford to collect and, in turn, to spend, large amounts of revenues.186
Accordingly, despite their relatively lower 1 − α, good institutions have higher levels of187
public capital than bad ones.188
Following both traditional and institutional approaches, we argue that the share of unde-189
clared income depends on t, e, r :190
y = y(t, e, r). (2)191
4 The term “public capital” contains all the growth-enhancing items potentially available for policymakers.
5 Our model examines the situation in which, ex post, tax dodgers are not detected but, ex ante, there is a
probability r > 0 that this happens. Consequently, though taxpayers take into account the expected penalty in
their optimization problem, no evader actually pays the penalty. It turns out that the State collects nomoney via
penalties. Considering this extra gain, however, just complicates themodel leaving our conclusions unaffected.
6 For a paper focusing on this topic see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and Mayshar (1991).
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In our context regulations can be thought of as the level of social control of business (Glaeser192
and Shleifer 2003). From the taxpayer’s standpoint fulﬁlling regulations is costly and, there-193
fore, they can be thought of as a tax in disguise.As a consequence, regulations affect positively194
the share of tax evasion. Aswe shall explain in Sect. 5, the Bureau cannot afford to freelyman-195
age the level of regulations. This is why we do not put regulations among the policymakers’196
instruments. The output Y depends on labor input and on α197
Y = g(L , α). (3)198
Detailed comments on this function are collected in the next section.199
4 The private sector200
Householdsmaximize their utility, under the budget constraint, pinning downboth the optimal201
share of undeclared income (y∗), and the optimal quantity of labor (L∗). The utility function202
of the private sector depends on L and C , and can be deﬁned as U (L ,C). U satisﬁes the203
usual properties:204
∂U (L ,C)
∂C
> 0;
∂U (L ,C)
∂L
< 0. (4)205
The consumption function depends on y, Y and t , it is deﬁned as C(t, y, Y ) and, obviously:206
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂y
> 0;
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂Y
> 0;
∂C(t, y, Y )
∂t
< 0. (5)207
Tax evasion is costly both because of the expected penalty to be caught and because hiding208
an ever growing income level is a more and more tricky activity (Cross and Shaw 1982). The209
cost function is K (r, y, Y ), with210
K (r, 0, Y ) = 0;
∂K (r, y, Y )
∂y
> 0;
∂K (r, y, Y )
∂r
> 0;
∂K (r, y, Y )
∂Y
> 0. (6)211
The household must solve the following problem:212 {
max
y,L
U (L ,C(t, y, g(L , α)))− K (r(α), y, g(L , α))
s.t. H(C(t, y, g(L , α))) = 0,
(7)213
where H = 0 is the budget constraint.214
It is worth noting that the role of y as decision variable does not contrast with the deﬁnition215
of y provided in (2): indeed, the dependence of y on the triple (t, e, r) states simply that216
the decisions taken by the private sector are affected also on the institutional (exogenous)217
parameters t, e, r . More speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that taxpayers take t, r, e, α as given218
and that they are indifferent in paying the same amount of different combinations of taxes,219
expected penalties, license fees, and the like. Let us ﬁx t, e, α ∈ [0, 1] and assume that the220
functionsU , K and H behave well, so that there exists a solution of the optimization problem221
(7) given by the couple (y∗(t, e, r(α)), L∗). The optimal level of output depends7 on α, and222
will be denoted as Y ∗ = Y ∗(α) = g(L∗, α).223
How are α and L∗ related? From the macroeconomic point of view, Munnell (1992) has224
claimed that the correlation between (1 − α) and Y/L is positive. That is to say, for any225
7 See also the discussion in Acemoglu et al. (2005).
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given Y, α and L∗ are positively related. From the microeconomic standpoint, then, it has226
been argued that a lower α is associated to a bigger evasion. It, in turn, increases expected227
consumption for any given amount of leisure, this latter increases, and labor supply declines228
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). Thus, once again, L∗ = L∗(α) may be thought of as an229
increasing function of α.230
As for the optimal output level, it is a function of α, i.e. Y ∗ = Y ∗(α) = g(L∗(α), α) and231
we assume that Y ∗ and α are linked such a way to produce a Laffer-shaped curve, i.e. there232
exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that:233 ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α
> 0, for α < α¯;
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α
< 0, for α > α¯;
∂g(L∗(α),α)
∂α
= 0, for α = α¯.
(8)234
The rationale behind is that countries severely lacking in public capital (i.e. with a very high235
α) or ﬁscal apparatuses (i.e. with a very low α) are likely to have lower Y than those with less236
extreme situations. We now turn our attention to the links between y∗ and t . A logical, and237
traditional (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), assumption is that the optimal undeclared income238
y∗(t, e, r) is an increasing function of t . We postpone the discussion on the relationship239
between y∗ and the parameters e and r (or α) to the next section.240
As for the relationship between Y ∗, L∗ and the tax rate t we are able to prove that they241
are directly related. In fact, since C is continuous and increasing with respect to Y ceteris242
paribus, then it is also invertible, i.e. given e and α, there exists a function RYe,α such that243
C∗t = C(t, y∗(t, e, r(α)), Y ∗) ⇔ Y ∗e,α = RYe,α (C∗t ).244
Given e, α ∈ [0, 1], we can write Y ∗e,α as a function of the tax rate as follows: Y ∗e,α =245
Y ∗e,α(t) = RYe,α (C∗t ).246
By the same token of Eq. (8), we write the lafferian relation between Y ∗e,α and t , i.e. there247
exists t¯e,α ∈ (0, 1) such that248 ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt > 0, for t < t¯e,α;
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt < 0, for t > t¯e,α;
dY ∗e,α(t)
dt = 0, for t = t¯e,α .
(9)249
Furthermore, since g in (3) is continuous and increasing with respect to L , then it is also250
invertible. For a ﬁxed α ∈ [0, 1], we denote dα as the inverse of g with respect to L at the251
level α, and write:252
Y ∗e,α = g(L
∗, α) ⇔ L∗α = dα(Y ∗e,α). (10)253
Equation (10) allows us to write L∗ as a function of t : L∗α = L∗α(t) = dα(Y ∗e,α(t)).254
5 The state255
In our model, policymakers have two instruments to pursue one of two alternative targets.256
The government decides (i) the tax rate and (ii) the share of revenues devoted to ﬁght the tax257
evasion rather than to increase the public capital in order to maximize either its revenues or258
the GDP. These goals should be seen as representative of the policies usually implemented259
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in, respectively, social-democratic and capitalistic countries. We will show that, as expected,260
policymakers cannot maximize both T and Y contemporaneously. Another potential policy261
tool in our context is the level of regulation. We have chosen not to consider it as a device262
because, to some extent, the Bureau cannot afford to freely manage the level of regulations.263
In fact, as fairly noted by Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), the American and European societies264
are much richer today than they were a century ago, yet they are also vastly more regulated.265
The structural factor behind this is that modern good, ﬁnancial and labor markets inevitably266
need regulations to protect weaker agents (respectively, consumers, savers and workers). The267
recent developments in ﬁnancial markets and the following, strong, reaction of the Bureaus268
are an undisputable example of what we are talking about. Our model points out that there269
are threshold values activating non linear associations among the variables under scrutiny.270
In this section we explain the rich relationships between the involved variables from the271
ruler’s standpoint, and how these connections affect the performances of T - or Y -maximizing272
governments.273
We model the quality of the institutional setting as depending on the levels of regulation,274
e, and the probability to be detected, r . Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a function a of the variables e275
and r such that a(e, r) describes the institutional setting of a country with regulation level e276
and probability of detection r . a is a continuous function with respect to e and r . Henceforth277
we use the convention that a country with institutional index a1 has a weaker institutional278
setting than a country with institutional index a2 if and only if a1 < a2.279
As already mentioned, there are reasons to think that r is positively correlated with the280
efﬁciency of the Bureau. Thus, a(e, r) is an increasing function of r . Moreover, since r281
increases with respect to α, then a(e, r(α)) increases with respect to α as well. Therefore, a282
is an invertible function of α, and there exists an increasing function b such that283
a = a(e, r(α)) ⇔ α = b(a). (11)284
In contrast, the behavior of a with respect to e is more complicated. The parameter e is285
non linearly linked to the bureaucratic structure of the State. The idea is that both disorder286
(e = 0) and dictatorship (e = 1) are bad institutional settings. More in general, we claim287
that above a certain critical value of e the government’s activity becomes so intrusive (“from288
the cradle to the grave”) that the Bureau just cannot avoid over-regulating. For instance,289
public goods and services might be offered at prices lower than the market ones, giving290
rise to an excess of demand that needs to be regulated. In addition, the government’s size291
may trigger over-regulations simply to justify its own presence. So we assume that, for any292
α ∈ [0, 1], the institutional index a(e, r(α)) admits a global maximum in a critical threshold293
e = e¯α ∈ (0, 1). More formally:294 ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e
> 0, for e < e¯α;
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e
< 0, for e > e¯α;
∂a(e,r(α))
∂e
= 0, for e = e¯α.
(12)295
Substantially, relation (12) means that the maximum level of the institutional setting index296
can be obtained in countries with neither too light nor too heavy regulation frameworks.297
The dependence of y∗ on regulation e and on the probability of detection r can be explicated298
through the institutional parameter a. To this end, we write y∗(t, e, r) = y∗(t, a(e, r)),299
assuming that y∗ decreaseswith respect to the institutional setting parameter a. Consequently,300
y∗ decreases as α increases. Finally, in view of the optimization problems assessed in the301
next section, we note that tax revenues can be written both as:302
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T = t[(1− y∗)Y ∗]. (13)303
and as304
T = T (a, t). (14)305
Equation (13) includes one of the two policy instruments, namely the tax rate t (the other306
is α), and the three policy variables (T, y∗, and Y ∗) we are focusing on. In the following307
sections we will study how the instruments affect these variables. Finally, note that formula308
(14) emphasizes the relation between tax revenues, the institutional setting (a) and the tax309
rate.310
5.1 The optimizing state311
This section is devoted to the analysis of the two optimization problems faced by the State.312
The ﬁrst goal consists in solving the following:313
max
t,α
T (a(e, r(α)), t). (15)314
In order to tackle the problem, we ﬁrst analyze the behavior of the tax revenues with respect315
to both t and α.316
Following the standard literature, there exists a threshold for the tax rate t˜e,α ∈ (0, 1) such317
that:318 ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t > 0, for t < t˜e,α;
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t < 0, for t > t˜e,α;
∂T (a(e,r(α),t)
∂t = 0, for t = t˜e,α.
(16)319
It is important to observe that (16) comes out from the model. Indeed we argue that,320
ceteris paribus, a change in the tax rate creates two opposite effects: (i) the tax revenues321
T (a(e, r(α), t) increases linearly with respect to t (see (13)); (ii) the tax revenues are reverse322
U-shaped with respect to t , as (9) and (13) state. Formula (16) gives the usual Laffer-type323
relation between tax revenues and tax rate when the latter is stronger than the former.324
Yetwe also stress that, unlike themainstream literature, condition (16) implies that the gov-325
ernment revenues of a country with institutional parameter a(e, r(α)) follow an institutions-326
conditional Laffer curve, t˜e,α being the optimal Laffer tax rate. Now, consider e, t ∈ [0, 1].327
There exists a threshold α such that:328 ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α
> 0, for α < α;
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α
< 0, for α > α;
∂T (a(e,r(α)),t)
∂α
= 0, for α = α.
(17)329
Even the relation (17) stems from the model. As, ceteris paribus, the parameter α changes,330
two contrasting behaviors emerge: (i) tax revenues T (a(e, r(α)), t) are reverseU-shapedwith331
respect to α (see Eqs. (8) and (13)); (ii) tax revenues increase, since y∗ decreases. Similarly332
to the previous reasoning, we argue that the former effect is more relevant than the latter,333
hence formula (17). An excessive α, in fact, while reducing tax evasion also hampers the334
public capital accumulation and, hence, output. Due to the diminished taxable income, tax335
collection shrinks.336
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Remark 1 Due to the presence of the ceteris paribus positive effect of the tax rate on tax337
revenues, it is immediate to see that the threshold for the tax rate t¯e,α ∈ (0, 1) deﬁned in (9)338
cannot be greater than t˜e,α . By the same token, we have α > α¯, where α¯ is deﬁned in (8). As339
we shall see, this outcome will turn out to be useful when comparing different policies.340
Following the argument above, it also turns out that, if a1 < a2, then T (a1, t) < T (a2, t),341
for any t ∈ (0, 1].342
The optimization problem (15) is then solved by the pair (t∗, α∗) = (t˜e,α, α), i.e.:343
max
t,α
T (a(e, r(α)), t) = T (a(e, r(α∗)), t∗) = T (a(e, r(α)), t˜e,α). (18)344
Let us now examine the second goal. By (3) and (10), the problem can be formalized as345
follows:346
max
t,α
g(α, L∗α(t)). (19)347
The solution of the optimization problem (19) comes out from the analysis of the household’s348
output. In this case, formulas (8) and (9) give that Y ∗ is reverse U-shaped both with respect349
to both t and α. Therefore, the solution of the optimization problem is (t∗, α∗) = (t¯e,α¯, α¯),350
and we have:351
max
t,α
g(α, L∗α(t)) = g(α
∗, L∗α∗(t
∗)) = g(t¯e,α¯, L∗α¯(t¯e,α¯)). (20)352
5.2 Some remarkable results353
The optimization performed in the previous section allow us to emphasize some important354
features of our model.355
Let us start from the analysis of the T -maximizing State.356
The function T is well-behaved so that we can explicitly describe how e and α affects357
the optimal tax rate t∗ in deﬁning t˜e,α . In fact, by applying the Implicit Function’s Theorem358
(IFT), there exists a function t∗ = t∗(a) that is continuous and such that359
∂T (a, t∗(a))
∂t
= 0, ∀ a ∈ R. (21)360
The IFT and Eq. (21) allow us to think of the Laffer optimal tax rate t∗ as a function of the361
institutional setting a. Following Friedman et al. (2000), we assume that t∗(a) is an increasing362
function. Also, conditional on any given a, we deﬁne the Laffer-optimal (maximum) revenue363
level T ∗a := T (a, t∗(a)). Since T is positively related to a, then T ∗a is increasing with respect364
to a as well.365
Wenow limit the analysis to the situation inwhich a country, with an institutional setting a,366
levies the optimal tax rate t∗(a) and reaches the maximum level of revenue T ∗a . Accordingly,367
the following analysis will be restricted to the optimal tax rate, t = t∗. It is worth noticing368
that we use this restriction only because in whichever point different from the lafferian top369
tax rate our results are simply reinforced. This said, we ask: what are the features of this370
peculiar “best case” ﬁscal framework?371
• T ∗ decreases with respect to the undeclared level of income y∗, as it naturally should be.372
• Since t∗ = t∗(a) is continuous and increasing, then it is also invertible. Thus, there exists373
a function k such that374
t∗ = t∗(a) ⇔ a = k(t∗). (22)375
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A standard analytical argument gives that k is continuous and increasing.376
From (22) and since t∗ is increasing with respect to a, it turns out that only countries with377
a high-quality institutional setting can afford to impose a large optimal tax rate threshold378
t∗(a). This is in line with the analysis by Friedman et al. (2000). Notwithstanding the high379
tax rate, this kind of Bureau enjoys a small optimal share of undeclared income because of380
the high expected penalty facing its taxpayers.381
A furthermathematical implication of the connections between a and y∗ is the invertibility382
of y∗ as a function of a. There exists a decreasing function m such that383
y∗ = y∗(t∗(a), a) ⇔ a = m(y∗). (23)384
Condition (23) has a deep as well as logic signiﬁcance: an increase in the share of undeclared385
income, y∗, worsens the institutional setting of a country.386
This outcome is in stark contrast with the positive correlation between t and y∗ highlighted387
by the standard approach to the tax evasion. In particular, as we will show, our theoretical388
model points out that for themaximum level of institutional setting, a¯, the share of undeclared389
income is minimized. However, the institutional setting level a¯ cannot be attained. As a390
consequence, the theoretical minimum level of undeclared income is outside the strategies391
available to the government. As such, it is not a practicable equilibrium of the economic392
system.393
By the arguments explained above on the institutional setting parameter a, we are able394
to show that self-consistent, feasible, triplets do not allow to obtain a situation with zero395
tax evasion. We keep analyzing the “best case”, that is the optimal lafferian State: (t, α) =396
(t∗, α∗).397
Fix e ∈ [0, 1] and deﬁne the function fe of the variable α such that398
fe(α∗) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))). (24)399
As stated above, the optimal revenue T ∗a is continuous and increasing with respect to a;400
moreover, a = a(e, r(α∗)) is a continuous and increasing function with respect to α∗. Thus,401
the function fe deﬁned in (24) is continuous and increasing, and this implies the existence402
of its inverse Qe, that is continuous and increasing and works as follows:403
fe(α∗) = T ∗a ⇔ α∗ = qe(T ∗a ). (25)404
Consider now the optimal regulation threshold deﬁned implicitly in (12).405
Fix α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and deﬁne the function f1,α∗ of the variable e such that406
f1,α∗(e) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))), ∀ e ∈ [0, e¯α∗ ]. (26)407
T ∗a is continuous and increasing with respect to a and a = a(e, r(α∗)) is continuous and408
increasing with respect to e in [0, e¯]. Thus, there exists its inverse q1,α∗ that is increasing and409
such that410
f1,α∗(e) = T ∗a ⇔ e = q1,α∗(T ∗a ), ∀ T ∗a ∈ [T ∗a(0,r(α∗)), T ∗a(e¯α∗ ,r(α∗))]. (27)411
A very similar argument gives that, if we ﬁx α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and deﬁne the function f2,α∗ of the412
variable e such that413
f2,α∗(e) = T ∗a(e,r(α∗)) = T (a(e, r(α∗)), t∗(a(e, r(α∗)))), ∀ e ∈ [e¯α∗ , 1], (28)414
then there exists a decreasing function q2,α∗ such that415
f2,α∗(e) = T ∗a ⇔ e = q2,α∗(T ∗a ), ∀ T ∗a ∈ [T ∗a(1,r(α∗)), T ∗a(e¯α∗ ,r(α∗))]. (29)416
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The truemeaningof the formalized relations betweenLaffer-optimal revenues and regulations417
can be stated as follows: a greater level of revenues implies that a country spending α (to418
increase r ) is improving its bureaucratic apparat so that e is approaching e¯α , i.e. the “Laffer-419
optimal” regulation level.420
More importantly, the relationship between the couples (T ∗, α∗) and (T ∗, e) formalized421
in (25), (27) and (29), allows us to state the existence of a relationship between e and α∗.422
Speciﬁcally, there exists a function h such that α∗ = h(e) and423
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
h′(e) > 0, for e < e¯α∗;
h′(e) < 0, for e > e¯α∗;
h′(e) = 0, for e = e¯α∗ .
(30)424
Our model has important implications.425
Next Proposition proves that the T -maximizing State has some constraints in choosing426
the share of public expenditure devoted to ﬁght the tax evasion:427
Proposition 2 The level α∗ = 1 cannot be reached.428
Another intriguing result of our analysis deals with the persistence properties, and the429
consequent ineluctability, of the tax evasion:430
Proposition 3 Given e ∈ [0, 1], then431
y∗(t∗(a(e, r(α∗))), e, r(α∗)) > 0.432
Let us now turn our attention to the output-maximizing State. In this case next Proposition433
will show that, starting from (20), the underground economy cannot be avoided:434
Proposition 4 Given e ∈ [0, 1], then435
y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α¯)) > 0.436
Whichever the preferred target, then, another situation in which the tax evasion can be437
reduced to zero is when the ruler sets the tax rate equal to zero. Although clearly this is too438
extreme a case, our model allows to conceptualize it. If a country applies a tax rate t = 0, then439
(22) gives that the institutional setting of the country is a = g(0). Since g is an increasing440
function, then g(0) = a¯ = 0. As expected, t = 0 is incompatible with functional values of441
the other variables of the model. Moreover,442
Remark 5 If the only aim of the State were to minimize the tax evasion, it should implement443
t∗ = 0 and/or α∗ = 1. The former is unrealistic and the latter is impossible (see Proposition444
2). This is a supporting argument to the unavoidability of the underground economy.445
All in all, the State is not able to erase totally the tax evasion.446
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Finally, by Remark 1, we have that the tax rate which maximizes the output cannot be447
greater than the one maximizing the tax revenues. This fact implies that the ﬁscal policies448
that a country should implement to maximize the output are lighter than the ones useful for449
the maximization of the revenues.450
Remark 6 Our model is able to conceptualize bad and good equilibria. The former are char-451
acterized by a low level of tax rate and institutional setting and a high level of tax evasion.452
Good equilibria, instead, are identiﬁed by a high level of tax rate and institutional setting,453
and a low level of tax evasion.454
The arguments outlined in Remark 6 come out directly from the relationship between455
the variables a, y∗ and t∗. Speciﬁcally, formula (22) explains that t∗ and a are positively456
correlated, while (23) states that y∗ and a are negatively correlated.457
6 The model and the reality458
This section offers a simple attempt to see how our theoretical model is able to match the real459
world. In doing that we focus on two rich countries, likely lying in good equilibria and that460
differ with respect to their macroeconomic goals, namely revenues and output maximiza-461
tion. As mentioned, these goals could be seen as representative of the policies implemented462
in, respectively, social-democratic (say, Sweden, henceforth denoted with subscript 1) and463
capitalistic (say, the USA, henceforth denoted with subscript 2) countries.464
Before going through the data, it is worth recalling that ours is a static general equilibrium465
model. Thus, what is important here is to see whether our theoretical suggestions match the466
systematic tendencies of data with no consideration about dynamics.8 The generality of our467
model is also mirrored in the deﬁnitions of some of the variables we are dealing with. Just to468
mention, in our economy there is just one tax rate, the institutional setting may be thought469
of as including several (potentially strongly correlated) variables such as corruption, the rule470
of law and so on. This means that, hopefully, further (empirical and theoretical) analyses471
can stem from our model. Yet, there is an obvious trade off between the number of variables472
and the analytical tractability of a model.9 Also, as already underlined, our main aim is the473
theoretical conceptualization, not the quantiﬁcation, of the links between the variables. These474
latter, then, are non linear and, accordingly, not easy to examine by standard econometric475
tools.10 On the positive side, we can afford to compare just two economic systems. Obviously,476
it greatly simpliﬁes the comparisons and reduces data problems. Finally, it should be clear477
that the less reliable data are, the greater is the need for the empirical analysis to be supported478
by sound theoretical indications. This said, we are eventually ready to see whether the real479
life situation matches the analytical structural prescriptions of the model.480
According to our model, t1 > t2. Indeed, the tax rates that a revenues-maximizing country481
imposes on citizens is greater than the one imposed by an output-maximizing country, as482
Remark 1 shows. This result ﬁts the evidence of a structurally larger tax rate in Sweden than483
8 For a recent example of a dynamic analysis dealing with the tax evasion, see Cerqueti and Coppier (2011).
9 For instance, an intriguing improvement of our model could be inserting income distribution and/or, more
explicitly, corruption in our framework. Hillman (2004) describes how corruption, akin tax evasion in our
model, reduces tax revenues and affects economic development.
10 This may explain the different results obtained by splitting world-wide samples as, e.g., in Friedman et al.
(2000) with respect to Bovi and Dell’Anno (2010).
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Fig. 1 t1 (continuous line) is constantly greater than t2 (dotted line)
in the USA. In Fig. 1 the time series of the annual tax rates11 applied in Sweden and in the484
USA in the period 1990:2009 are plotted.485
Since t1 > t2, our model states also that a1 > a2. Indeed, relations (22) show that the486
institutional parametera increaseswith respect to t . This result is in linewith both the common487
wisdom that a mature social democracy is featured by a top-quality institutional setting488
and qualitative data such as the World Bank’s “Indicators of Governance and Institutional489
Quality”.12490
Moreover, we also have that α1 > α2. This result is grounded on a1 > a2, by using the491
relations in (11). It sounds palatable and somewhat in line with the study by Van derWeele on492
tax evasion (2009)—a country with very high statutory tax rates needs to check tax evasion493
more forcefully than a country where the taxpayers are not request to contribute so heavily.494
Lastly, we have L1 > L2. This ﬁnding is based on α1 > α2, since L increases with respect495
to α. In fact, data shows that the employment rates in well-established social democracies are496
structurally larger than the ones recorded in capitalistic countries. Though ours is a theoretical497
model, we are nevertheless strongly tempted to speculate that this may be so due to well-498
functioning publicly-funded social infrastructures allowing, e.g., women to participate more499
actively in the labor market. This result is in line with the employment rates of the females in500
Sweden and in the USA. In Fig. 2 the time series of the annual female employment rates13501
in Sweden and in the USA in the period 1999:2009 are plotted—once again the structural502
indications of our model are mirrored in the trend of the data.503
Despite the availability of reliable data referring to hidden activities is almost by deﬁnition504
narrowed, some consideration based on the ranking appears reasonable. Speciﬁcally, ﬁgures505
say that y1 > y2 (see Table 1).506
11 Source: OECD.
12 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm.
13 Source: Eurostat.
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Fig. 2 L1 (continuous line) is constantly greater than L2 (dotted line)
Table 1 The estimate of the
shadow economy in Sweden and
USA
Source Bovi and Dell’Anno
(2010).
1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2003
y1 18.8 20.5 24.2 24.8 23.8 22.4
y2 7.2 8.9 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.2
On that, our model guarantees that the value of y increases with respect to t and decreases507
with a. Therefore, we argue that the legal tax rate in Sweden is so high that, in spite of the508
presence of very well functioning institutions, the Sweden’s underground sector is tenden-509
cially larger than that of the USA. This ﬁnding is in line with both the classical theoretical510
prescriptions of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and the empirical outcomes by Bovi and511
Dell’Anno (2010) that, like us, focus on rich economies.512
Given the Laffer relations for T with respect to t , and Y with respect to α, we are not513
able to theoretically conclude which is the greater between T1/Y1 and T2/Y2. Nonetheless,514
evidence suggests that T1/Y1 > T2/Y2. This means that an increase in the legal tax rate has515
a greater negative impact on output than on the tax revenues when a country maximizes the516
tax revenues.517
7 Concluding remarks518
The existing literature on tax evasion typically deals with its measurement, causes, conse-519
quences and remedies. Less analysed, at least explicitly, is the reason why the tax evasion520
is so persistent and how it impacts, given its longevity, on the long run macroeconomic521
performances of different economic systems.522
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This paper has exploited both traditional and recent indications to conceptualize the rela-523
tionships between taxation, institutional setting and tax evasion. In doing that, and since524
tax evasion is a fact of life even in rich countries, this paper has focussed on the compari-525
son between the macroeconomic performances of two well-established Bureaus—a social-526
democracy and a capitalistic country—which aim to maximize, respectively, ﬁscal revenues527
and GDP. The theoretical model is general and, as a consequence, it is robust to several528
speciﬁcations. Furthermore, it reconciles two important strands of research and it allows to529
examine a number of usually overlooked non linear “Laffer-type” connections. As per the530
comparison between economic systems, the model leads to the following results. Govern-531
ments cannot be revenues—and GDP-maximizers at the same time and the effects of the532
tax evasion are different according to the different policy targets pursued by the State. As533
compared to GDP-maximizing states, then, revenues maximizing ones are featured by higher534
tax rates, more pervasive regulations and, consequently, from larger tax evasion despite they535
spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the other hand, revenues maximizing gov-536
ernments can afford to have better institutional settings and greater participation rates. This537
said, in no case the Bureau is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may explain why538
this latter is so pervasive and persistent even in afﬂuent economies i.e., in the words of the539
institutional literature, even in good equilibria. As a consequence, differently politically-540
oriented mature countries may not share the same good equilibrium that, accordingly, is not541
unique.542
Appendix543
Proof of Proposition 2 Let us ﬁx e ∈ [0, 1] and assume α∗ = 1. Formula (30) assures that544
e = e¯α∗ = e¯1. Hence we get a(e, r(α∗)) = a(e¯1, r(1)) = a¯. From (22) and since the tax rate545
is increasing with respect to the institutional setting parameter a, we have that t∗ = t∗(a¯)546
is the maximum level of lafferian tax rate. This means that the share of undeclared income547
y∗(t∗) reaches its maximum level, since y∗(t∗) is increasing. The analysis of the Laffer548
revenue T ∗ points out that two inconciliable situations should coexist:549
• T ∗ must reach its maximum level as function of t∗(a¯) (see formula (16)).550
• T ∗ = T ∗(y∗)must reach its minimum level, since the level of the optimal Laffer revenue551
decreases with respect to y∗.552
We have an evident contradiction. ⊓⊔553
Proof of Proposition 3 Let us ﬁx e ∈ [0, 1] and assume y∗ = 0.554
By (23), we derive that a attains its maximum value a¯, since it decreases with respect to555
y∗. Therefore, t∗(a¯) is maximum, by using relation (22). Since y∗ increases with respect to556
the tax rate, we have an evident contradiction. ⊓⊔557
Proof of Proposition 4 Let us ﬁx e ∈ [0, 1] and assume α = α¯ and t = t¯e,α¯ .558
Since y∗ decreases with respect to α, then559
0 < y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α)) < y∗(t¯e,α¯, e, r(α¯)), ∀α < α¯,560
and the result is proved. ⊓⊔561
123
Journal: 11135-QUQU Article No.: 9849 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2013/4/29 Pages: 17 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
A quantitative view
References562
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.: The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change and economic563
growth. Am. Econ. Rev. 95(3), 546–579 (2005)564
Allingham, M., Sandmo, A.: Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J. Public Econ. 1, 323–338 (1972)565
Barro, R.J.: Government spending in a simple model of endogeneous growth. J. Political Econ. 98(5), 103–126566
(1990)567
Bernardi, A.: The economic problems of the Roman Empire at the time of its decline. In: Cipolla, C. (ed.) The568
Economic Decline of Empires, pp. 16–83. Methuen, London (1970)569
Bovi, M., Dell’Anno, R.: The changing nature of the OECD shadow economy. J. Evol. Econ. 20(1), 19–48570
(2010)571
Caballé, J., Panadés, J.: Tax evasion and economic growth. Public Financ. Financ. Publiques 52, 318–340572
(2000)573
Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R.: Corruption, tax evasion and economic growth. Econ. Model. 28(1–2), 489–500574
(2011)575
Cross, R., Shaw, G.K.: On the economics of tax aversion. Public Financ. 37, 36–47 (1982)576
Cule, M., Fulton, M.: Business culture and tax evasion: why corruption and the unofﬁcial economy can persist.577
J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 72(3), 811–822 (2009)578
Frey, B.S., Torgler, B.: Tax morale and conditional cooperation. J. Comp. Econ. 35(1), 136–159 (2007)579
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., Zoido-Lobaton, P.: Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants580
of unofﬁcial activity in 69 countries. J. Public Econ. 76, 459–494 (2000)581
Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A.: The rise of the regulatory state. J. Econ. Lit. 41, 401–425 (2003)582
Hanousek, J., Palda, F.: Quality of government services and the civic duty to pay taxes in the Czech and Slovak583
Republics, and other transition countries. Kyklos 57, 237–252 (2004)584
Hillman, A.L.: Corruption and public ﬁnance: an IMF perspective. Eur. J. Political Econ. 20(4), 1067–1077585
(2004)586
Hug, S., Spörri, F.: Referendums, trust, and tax evasion. Eur. J. Political Econ. 27(1), 120–131 (2011)587
Ihrig, J., Moe, K.S.: Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and government policy. J. Dev. Econ. 73(2),588
541–557 (2004)589
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., Zoido-Lobaton, P.: Regulatory discretion and corruption. Am. Econ. Rev. 88(2),590
387–392 (1998)591
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., Zoido-Lobaton, P.: Corruption. Public ﬁnances and the unofﬁcial economy.World592
Bank Working Paper No. 2169 (1999)593
Klepper, S., Nagin, D.: The anatomy of tax evasion. J. Law Econ. Organ. 5(1), 1–24 (1989)594
La Porta, R., Shleifer, A.: The unofﬁcial economy and economic development. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act.595
Fall, 275–363 (2008)596
Lai, C.-C., Chang, W.-Y.: Tax evasion and tax collections: an aggregate demand-aggregate supply analysis.597
Public Financ. 43, 138–146 (1988)598
Lai, C.-C., Chang, J.-J., Chang, W.-Y.: Tax evasion and efﬁcient bargains. Public Financ. 50, 96–105 (1995)599
Myles, G., Naylor, R.: A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs. Eur. J. Political600
Econ. 12, 49–66 (1996)601
Mayshar, J.: Taxation with costly administration. Scand. J. Econ. 93(1), 75–88 (1991)602
Peacock, A., Shaw, G.K.: Tax evasion and tax revenue loss. Public Financ. 37, 269–278 (1982)603
Pommerehne, W.W., Weck-Hannemann, H.: Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzer-604
land. Public Choice 88, 161–170 (1996)605
Ricketts, M.: On the simple macroeconomics of tax evasion: an elaboration of the Peacock–Shaw approach.606
Public Financ. 39, 420–424 (1984)607
Rosser, J.B., Rosser, M., Ahmed, E.: Multiple unofﬁcial economy equilibria and income distribution dynamics608
in systemic transition. J. Post Keynesian Econ. 25, 425–447 (2003)609
Slemrod, J., Yitzhaki, S.: The optimal size of a tax collection agency. Scand. J. Econ. 89(2), 25–34 (1987)610
Slemrod, J., Yitzhaki, S.: Tax avoidance, evasion and administration. In: Auerbach, A., Feldstein, M. (eds.)611
Handbook of Public Economics, pp. 1423–1470. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2002)612
Turnovsky, S.J., Basher, M.A.: Fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two-sector developing econ-613
omy. J. Dev. Econ. 88(2), 205–216 (2009)614
Van der Weele, J.: The signaling power of sanctions in social dilemmas. J. Law Econ. Organ. (2009). doi:10.615
1093/jleo/ewp039616
Von Zameck,W.: Tax evasion and tax revenue loss: another elaboration of the Peacock–Shaw approach. Public617
Financ. 44, 308–315 (1989)618
Yitzhaki, S.: A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J. Public Econ. 3(2), 201–202 (1974)619
123
Journal: 11135-QUQU Article No.: 9849 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2013/4/29 Pages: 17 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
